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t has been said that insurance is the last of the
financial services to accept radical change
(Denney [1995-1996]) . Yet there has been a fun-
damental shift in the geographic location and in
the organization of the reinsurance industry in the last
six years (Chichilnisky [19966]) . Global environmental
risks are partly responsible for this change ; increased
weather volatility and catastrophic risks are difficult to
diversify using traditional insurance practices .
To provide a map to the future, we need a real-
istic appraisal of how we got where we are. This is the
story of how humans have hedged risks . There are two
basic and distinct approaches : statistical and economic.
The former is typical of the insurance industry ; the lat-
ter typifies the securities industry. Both are needed to
manage today's catastrophic risks . Neither alone will
do. We show how a combination of both leads to effi-
cient outcomes, and is the way to the future
(Chichilnisky [1996a, 1996b, 1996d]) .
The volatility of weather, taken together with
population movement to warm coastal areas and chang-
ing property prices, has made catastrophic risks highly
unpredictable. Many scientists believe that climate
change could be the source . A recent report by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
charged by governments with investigating global
warming, says that humans have a "discernible" influ-
ence on global climate.
In May 1996, insurance executives confronted
the energy industry over global warming, and took their
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case to the United Nations Geneva meeting on climate
change in June 1996 (Boulton [1996]) . Their case was
heard, and for the first time the United States took a
leading position in supporting the developing countries'
calls for hard targets in the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions in the industrial countries. Environmental
markets that trade countries' rights to emit have been
proposed and loom large on the horizon. 1
FINANCIAL RISKS
Although the data on climate change are not
conclusive, the financial challenge is already real . In the
last few years the property/casualty insurance industry
has experienced record claims of about USS43 billion
connected with climate volatility. In the United States
alone, there was the 1988 Midwest drought, the 1993
Midwest floods, and 1995 flooding along the California
coast . Hurricane Andrew in 1992 produced about
US318 billion of insured losses and total losses greater
than USS25 billion (Chichilnisky [1996a]) .
Andrew was the most devastating natural catas-
trophe ever recorded . It also led to a wave of financial
catastrophe; the hurricane affected almost every insur
ance company in the United States . Not knowing how
to hedge unpredictable risks adds the risk of financial
catastrophe on top of that of the natural catastrophe, a
one-two punch that could lead to a societal disaster.
The year after Andrew, thirty-eight non-U.S . and eight
U.S . reinsurers, with names as familiar as Continental
Re and New England Re, either withdrew from the
business or ceased underwriting catastrophe reinsurance
(Chichilnisky [1996b]) .
Facing an impossible challenge, many reinsurers
left the market . Worldwide reinsurance capacity
dropped more than 30% between 1939 and 1993, and
it appears that over 20% of that is due to Andrew. This
naturally led to changes in the marketplace . Insurance
companies could not buy enough catastrophe reinsur-
ance, no matter how hard they tried. As supply dried
up, prices of course increased dramatically ; the rate on
line went from 8 .2% in 1989 to 21 .4% in 1994 .
Higher prices then attracted new capital. This
led to a major geographic shift of the industry.
Continuing doubts about the future existence of
Lloyd's of London led to a drop in the U.K . market
share, from about 56% in 1989 to 23%1 in 1995 . Since
1993 Bermuda's reinsurance industry evolved from
practically zero to its current position of 25% of the
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market . Investment banks are now betting heavily on
the reinsurance market . They are the owners of most of
the businesses created since 1992 .
REVOLUTION IN GLOBAL FINANCE
Together with the geographic shift, there has
been a substantial shift in the industry's strategy. The
insurance derivatives that have been recommended for
several years are starting to play a role.
In 1992, we recommended the creation of an
instrument to bet on the frequencies of catastrophes,
which the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) introduced
under the name Catastrophe Futures in 1993 (see
Chichilnisky and Heal [1993]). In 1997, Morgan
Stanley started marketing a similar instrument : a bond
issue whose returns are linked to hurricane frequency
arid severity in the current US. season . Recently,
Merrill Lynch structured a transaction for USAA, the
country's largest direct marketer ofhome and car insur-
ance, offering USS500 million in bonds on the U.S .
capital markets that are tied to the company's losses
from hurricanes (see Waters [1996]) .
Financial innovation in reinsurance markets is
slowly developing, but the underlying pressure' is
relentless. Everyone knows that access to more liquid
capital markets is essential to the reinsurance industry.
The derivatives market is the key to liquid arid flexible
trading of weather risks .
UNKNOWN RISKS
Unknown risks are risks whose frequencies we
do riot know, and for which we are aware ofour-
igno-rance (Chichilnisky [19964]) . You could think of these
as risks for which we have more than one actuarial
table, each equally likely. There is more than one prior
estimate of' the frequency of the event (see Cass,
Chichilnisky, and Wtr [1996]) .
Examples of unknown risks are environmental
health risks of new and little known epidemics, or risks
induced by scientific uncertainty in predicting the fre
quency and severity of catastrophic events such as
nuclear reactor and satellite risks . These risks are driv-
ing major changes in the insurance and reinsurance
industry today (see Chichilnisky and Heal [1998]).
Take a simple example. One reliable source gives
a 2% annual chance of the occurrence of a hurricane of
a certain type, and another a 12% chance . Monte Carlo
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simulations and other procedures can he used to
attempt to tease from all models a unique statistical
approximation to the true frequency. But what if there
is no true frequency?
How could this be? Easily. There nnay be two
possible climate patterns, both equally likely. This is
typical of complex arid chaotic systems such as the cli-
mate (see Chichilmsky [1995]) .
Many climate experts view climate as a fiuida-
mentally non-linear phenomenon in which chaotic pat-
terns emerge easily. Such systems can have two "attrac
tors," or two distinct overall patterns of behavior, each
significantly likely. Each of these attractors describes a
weather pattern, a reasonable statistical inference of the
frequencies of a major event . In such a chaotic systern,
it is scientifically impossible to predict from the initial
conditions which of the two patterns the climate will
take : a pattern with two hurricanes a year, or the other
with a dozen . Because we cannot predict, we face a risk .
We call it a chaotic risk because it emerges from the
chaotic nature of the climate system .
The first statistical reaction is to construct a new
actuarial table by taking an average ; assurning the two
states, 2% and 12%, are equally likely, this is 7%. But
taking an average does not help. It only ensures that
one is wrong 100% of the time: 50% of the time we
are overinsured (the pattern with two hurricanes per
year), and the other 50% we are underinsured (the pat-
tern with a dozen a year) . Both have major financial
costs. If each hurricane leads to US$2 billion in losses,
the averaging method leads to a US$10 billion short-
fall 50% of the time and US$10 billion overinsurance
the other 50% of the time. Hardly a measured way to
manage risks .
Is there a solution to this problem? The good news
is that there is. It is possible to hedge such unknown risks
successfully and efficiently. To do so, however, one needs
a careful and customized approach that blends both insur-
ance and securities approaches to hedging risks .
TWO WAYS TO HEDGE RISK
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Insurance: The Statistical Approach
The statistical approach to hedging risks, which
relies on the law of large numbers, is the traditional
foundation of the insurance industry.
For this to work, risks must be reasonably inde-
pendent across individuals or groups, and the frequencies
must be known. Loss of life arid car accidents are typical
ex:unples . Here the law of large numbers operates .
There is safety in numbers ; with a large enough
population, the number of those likely to be affected is
known with considerable accuracy. The sarriple mean is
highly predictable if the distribution for each person or
group is known. This is the standard principle oil
which insurance operates .
Reinsurance is simply a way to augment the
pool of those affected so that the law of large numbers
operates better. All that is needed is a reliable actuarial
table describing the incidence per person or group, and
a large pool of insureds to distribute the risk (see
Chichilriisky arid Heal [1993]) .
If the numbers are not large enough, it is stan-
dard to spread risk through time . The number of peo-
ple affected by a hurricane over a tern-year period is at
least ten times that affected in one year. This requires
that the risks be independent through time, eliminating
irreversible risks such as once-and-for-all shifts arising
from global warming .
Hurricanes such as Andrew (1992) and Opal
(1995), however, defy the law of large numbers. They
affect large areas all at once, both in physical arid in firian"
cial terms, arid their frequency and severity seem to'be
changing. The actuarial table itself has become the risk.
Insurance does not work . What are the alternatives?
Derivatives : The Economic Approach
Ail alternative is the economic approach . This
works best for correlated risks, in which the same event
occurs for many people all at once . A drop ill the value
of the dollar is an example ; the event is the same for
everyone in the US. economy. There is no way to pool
this risk, although, as we all know, we can hedge it by
using derivatives (currency futures or options) . The
principle used here is negative correlation . One hedges
by taking a position that is highly correlated with the
risk, except with the opposite sign .
For example, an investor with a dollar-based
portfolio who fears a drop in the value of the dollar can
buy a futures contract ill yen, or a dollar put . If the dol
lar drops in value, the investor is covered by the increase
in the value of the derivative . Bear funds have been
constructed on this principle .
The economic procedure is radically different
from the insurance approach in that it does not require a
large number of people. Nor does it require knowing the
frequency ofthe event or the actuarial table . This frrrida-
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mentally different method is the way the securities indus-
try operates . Instead ofpooling risks, one trades risks.
Securities markets are, however, notoriously
complex. For example, the procedure of trading risks
just outlined makes no sense for individual risks, such
as death. How would we describe the death ofone sin-
gle person within a large economy as one event on
which all of us can trade? To do so would require an
unrealistically high number of securities, indeed 2',
where x is the number of people in the economy. In a
world with five billion people, the number of securi-
ties could exceed the number of all known particles in
the universe (see Chichilrlisky and Heal [1993]) .
Insurance, instead, deals with such risks expe-
ditiously. If all individuals are in a similar risk class,
one insurance contract would suffice . The contrast is
stark, but it makes a point. In a world of unknown
risks, neither securities nor insurance rilethods work
in isolation .
THE IDEAL HEDGE:
CATASTROPHE BUNDLES
We see that insurance does not work when the
frequency of a risk is unknown, arid securities do not
work when the risks are individual . If neither of these
two approaches works on its own, what does work?
The ideal hedge is a combination of insurance
and securities; this earl achieve efficient allocation of
risk-bearing . We call this a catastrophe bundle because it
bundles together two types ofinstruments. It consists of
ail insurance instrument with a novel derivative securi-
ty for betting on the frequency itself (see Chichilrlisky
and Heal [1993]).
The latter type of security has emerged and is
now traded oil the CBOT As we have mentioned,
related securities have recently emerged also in the form
ofbonds floated by Morgan Stanley arid Merrill Lynch.
The combination of both instruments ensures
that no financial catastrophe will occur, since the rein-
surer is not exposed to more risks than it can afford . At
the same time, this approach can be used to provide
nearly full coverage for the insured at a rninirrlal cost .
We show elsewhere that such instruments lead to
an efficient allocation of risk-bearing (see Chichilnisky
and Heal [1993, 1995] and Cass, Chichllillsky and Wu
[1996]). They require a carefully customized approach
to hedging risk. This gives the traditional face-to-face
insurance approach an edge over raw technology.
MANAGING UNKNOWN RISK
HOW DO CATASTROPHE
BUNDLES WORK?
Catastrophe bundles work best in the hands of
an experienced reirlsurer or broker who can customize
the instrument to the client's needs. Ill a wily, the reirl
surer is selling a package that consists of insurance, a
security, and a risk managernerit/consulting tool .
The broker must first identify with the client the
set of possible descriptions of the risk . This crucial part
of the process involves new techniques of risk manage
rilerlt . It is best handled on a face-to-face and customized
basis . A mathematical formula is then brought to bear in
customizing catastrophe bundles to customer needs. This
formula works very well when there is more than one
pattern of risk and therefore more than one "possible"
actuarial table, each table being substantially likely.
After this is achieved, derivative securities whose
payoffs depend on which description of the risk is cor-
rect are introduced . These securities serve to hedge
uncertainty about actuarial tables . Finally, one struc-
tures insurance contracts that establish a compensation
arrangement in a way that depends on which descrip-
tion of the risk is correct .
Catastrophe bundles are proprietary, and their use
in a particularly simple case is illustrated in Exhibit 1 .
PRICING AND OPTIMAL PORTFOLIOS
Fund rnarlagers earl look at the flip side of this
picture and seek a combination of insurance and securi-
ties that offer an optimal portfolio in insurance and
investment markets. A part of this instrument is what
Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley have floated recently.
Securitizing such instruments is, of course, the next step.
Through the use of catastrophe bundles, the
reinsurance broker can access a large pool of managed
fiends while offering its clients a customized reinsurance
service that manages risks optimally, and at very com-
petitive prices .
Pricing, of course, is a crucial issue. What is
needed here is to separate two parts of the risks and to
push each as far as it will go . The contingent insurance
part of the instrument should be applied as far as possi-
ble, covering the independent part of the risk for which
it is optimally suited . Securities are then used for the
purpose for which they are best : the correlated part of
the risk . A mathematical formula used to construct the
catastrophe bundle separates and prices both parts.
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EXHIBIT 1
CATASTROPHE BUNDLE EXAMPLE
HURRICANE RISKS AND EL NINO:
AN EXAMPLE
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Hurricane worse th . an $3 billion once in 15-year or once in 5 :
Insurance covers individual property risks
Securities cover frequency risk
CONVERGENCE OF INSURANCE
AND SECURITIES MARKETS
It is no secret that the securities industry is mak-
ing inroads into the reinsurance business . By itself,
however, it cannot succeed, because the individual parts
of the risks cannot be handled efficiently by securities
markets ; they are too cumbersome for individual risks.
Insurance, based on the law of large numbers, has an
important place in simplifying financial transactions and
hedging known individual risks.
Catastrophe bundles offer one approach to corn-
puting the limits of each instrument, and blending
them optimally to achieve the most competitive pricing
of a catastrophe reinsurance portfolio .
The future of the industry is in the hands of
those who achieve the optimum balance, through inte-
grating derivative securities with contingent insurance
contracts, and integrating technology with customized
face-to-face know-how.
How exactly would catastrophe bundles work?
We answer that question with a simple but typical
example, drawn from hurricane insurance. Hurricane
incidence is conditioned by the ENSO cycle, so we
consider, instead of hurricane bonds of the type that
have recently been issued, a tradable ENSO index. 2 This
index would achieve everything one needs from hurri-
cane bonds, but in a more general and simple fashion .
A tradable ENSO index is a contract that pays an
agreed amount contingent on the value of a physical
index. It is similar in concept to the catastrophe futures
traded on the CBOT, and is an example of a security
conditional on the incidence of the insured peril, that
is, on which risk description is correct.
There are two extreme states o£ the ENSO
cycle, known as El Nifio and La Nina. In El N14110
years, hurricane incidence in the southeastern US. i s
below average ; in La Nina years, it is above.
Exhibit 1 shows possible probability distribu-
tions of damage due to hurricanes conditional on El
Nifo or La Nina years.
As an example, assume that, in an El Nino year,
there is a 10% chance of a $5 billion loss, a 20% chance
of a $10 billion loss, and a 10% chance of a $15 billion
loss . The expected value of the damage is therefore (0.1
x $5) + (0.2 x $10)+(0.1 x $15) = $4 billion. In a La
Nifia year, the probabilities are 20%, 30%, and 20%,
respectively, giving an expected loss of $7 billion .
Assume that there is a 40% chance of an El Nino year,
and a 60% chance of a La Nifia year. The total value of
insured property is taken as $30 billion, so that in a
worst case scenario - when the hurricane damage is at
its maximum of$15 billion- halfofthus value is at risk .
In an El Nifo year, the expected loss is 13.33%
of the insured risks, and in a La Nina year, it is 23.33%.
It follows that the rates on line (i .e ., premiums as a per
centage of the insured amount) conditional on being in
El Nifio and La Nina years would need to be at least
13 .33% and 23.33%, respectively, to break even in
expected value terms.
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EXHIBIT 2
HURRICANE PROBABILITIES AND THE ENSO SYSTEM
Probabilities of louses in El Nino and La Nina Years
As we have already noted, expected losses are
different, depending on what type of year we are in .
Before we know what kind of year will occur, we
therefore have an expected loss due to El Niflo equal to
the expected loss in an El Niflo year times the proba-
bility of such a year, i .e ., (0.4 x $4) = $1 .6 billion . For
La Nifia, the equivalent calculation is (0.6 x $7) = $4.2
billion . Hence, ex ante, before we know which year we
are or will be in, the expected losses in El Niflo arid La
Nina years are, respectively, $1 .6 billion and $4.2 bil-
lion, giving a total of $5.8 billion as the annual expect-
ed loss altogether.
We can now compute the prelniurne that would
have to be charged for cover in each type of year
before the type of year is known, in order to break
even on average . These would have to be the premi-
ums contingent on being in each year - seen above to
be 13.33% and 23.33% for El Nifio arid La Nifia -
multiplied by the probabilities of each type of year.
Thus the ex ante rates on line (before it is known
whether we are in an El Niflo or a La Nifia year) have
to be at least (0.4 x 13.33%) = 5.33% or (0.6 x
23 .33%) = 13.99%, respectively.
If insurers follow 'the obvious and traditional
procedure of charging premiuriL based on the overall
expected loss and not distinguishing between the two
climate patterns, they will charge premiums that will
bring in their overall ex ante expected loss of $5.8 bil-
lion, implying a rate on line of 5.8/3() = 19.33%. This
is unsatisfactory because in El Niflo years they are over-
charging (expected claims are $4 billion ; the rate on
line need be only 13.33%); La Nifia years, they are
undercharging (expected claims are $7 billion ; a rate oil
line of 23.33% is needed) .
In the former case, the insur-
ers are charging premiums in excess
of expected losses by $1 .8 billion,
hardly a competitive strategy, and in
the latter case, prenriuni income
falls short of expected claims by
$1 .2 billion, clearly a dangerous and
unsustainable position . Neither case
is satisfactory. To match assets to lia-
bilities properly, insurers need to
shift income from El Niflo to La
Nifia years .
This is where securities con-
ditional on incidence, on descrip-
tion of the risk, come into the pic-
ture. They can be used to transfer
income between El Niflo and La Nifia years so that the
surplus in the former cover the deficit in the latter . We
need a security whose value depends on the incidence
ofhurricanes ; for the purposes ofthis example, we take
this to be a tradable ENSO index. This would be a
contract whose value depends on the value of the
ENSO index and in which traders can take long or
A
short positions. By trading this security, the insurer in
our example can in effect trade income in El Niflo
years for income in La Nifia years .
The odds work out nicely. The insurer wants to
sell $1 .8 billion in an El Nifro year, its surplus of pre-
mium income over expected claims, which occurs with
a 40% chance . Correspondingly, it needs to buy $1 .2
billion of income in La Nifia years, to cover the short-
fall between premium income and expected claims . Ill
our example, this happens 60% of the time.
The prices for ENSO index contracts delivering
$1 in El Nifio and La Nifia years will be proportional
to the probabilities ofthese events, and so will be in the
ratio of 0.4/0.6 or 2/3. But $1 .2 billion/$1 .8 billion =
2/3, so that at such prices the sale of surplus income in
El Niflo years will exactly finance the purchase of
income to cover the deficit in La Nifia years .
Overall, then, we have a pattern of transactions
as follows :
1 . Issuing insurance contracts which provide cover
against damage in either El Niflo or La Nina years.
2 .
	
Selling $1.8 billion of contracts contingent on the
ENSO index having a value corresponding to an El
Niflo year, at a price of $0.40 per dollar.
3 . Buying $1 .2 billion of contracts contingent on the
ENSO index having a value corresponding to a La
Nina year, at $0 .60 per dollar.
This specific combination of trades in securities
and insurance policies described in these steps is what
we refer to as "catastrophe bundles." Through trading
catastrophe bundles, insurers can arrange complete
cover for themselves and their clients at minimum cost,
in spite of not knowing what the odds of loss will be .
They achieve this by a specific tailor-made combination
of insurance contracts and securities . All these contracts
are conditional on the incidence of the insured risk .
How different is this approach from the practice
today? The securities issued today securitiee insurance
or reinsurance risks, and therefore bring more liquidity
to the reinsurance market . This is an improvement. But
these securities still leave open the possibility that the
insurer is either offering non-competitive rates or tak-
ing on a dangerous exposure . Today's securities do not
tackle the essence of the problem.
The key to catastrophe bundles is to recognize
that when there are several possible actuarial tables, all
reasonably likely, we have to supplement insurance
introducing and trading securities dependent on them .
A specific combination of insurance and securities, and
an equally specific pricing policy, are required for an
optimal allocation of risks on competitive terms.
-ENDNOTES
'Chichilnisky [199(w] advances a proposal for a global
rnarket on greenlaousc g.Le emissions :and an International Bank for
Envirorunental Settlements to Inaradle executions, clearing, aril set-
tlements as well as regulate borrowing and lending rates .
ZENSO stands for the El Niio-Soudaern Oscillator, the
narne given to t}ne weather pattern that originates is the equatorial
Pacific and influences rainfall and storm incidence from Australia to
southern Africa . An indicator ofdie state of tire ENSO cycle is a sea
surface temperature (SST) index for the equatorial Pacific .
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3Tlnas Ls a sinaplaication . There are also years that are nei-
ther, so-called neutral years. The numbers we use in this example
are purely illustrative .
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